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DOGMATISM AND THE PERCEPTION OF SIMILARITY IN  
INTERPERSONAL SITUATIONS

by



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A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Dogmatism and the Perception of Similarity in Interpersonal Situations" submitted by Dolf Ryks in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.





## ABSTRACT

The current research project was conducted to investigate the relationship between dogmatism and reactions to a stimulus person who varied in status and presented either similar or discrepant information on a value statement of central importance to the S. Ss evaluated the stimulus person on a number of personality traits, rated the favorability of his arguments and assessed the importance of the target issue before and after the presentation of the information.

Three measures of similarity, personality similarity (PS), value similarity (VS), and assumed similarity (AS); three measures of favorability, favorability towards the stimulus person (FSP), favorability towards the stimulus person's arguments (FSA), and favorability of the stimulus person in relation to the ratings of the self (DFSP) and a measure of value change (VC) were examined in a factorial design. In all the dependent measures except value change (VC), which yielded no significant results, there was a significant main effect for agreement ( $p < .01$ ). If the stimulus person agreed with the S, he was evaluated as similar and favorable. Also, there was a significant main effect for status in all three favorability measures: high status persons and their arguments were rated more favorably than those of low status persons ( $p < .01$ ). There were significant dogmatism x status interactions for (1) Personality Similarity (PS) Score ( $p < .01$ ), (2) Favorability of the Description of the Stimulus Person (FSP) ( $p < .01$ ), (3) Favorability Towards the Stimulus Person in Relation to the Ratings of the Self (DFSP) ( $p < .01$ ). Two of



these measures, PS and DFSP, demonstrated that dogmatic Ss rated the high status person as more similar and favorable than the low status source; but for nondogmatic individuals, low status persons were rated as more similar and favorable. The FSP data revealed that nondogmatic persons were unresponsive to status differences, but dogmatic Ss favored a high to low status source in their ratings of favorability of the stimulus person. A triple interaction, dogmatism x status x agreement, was significant for the DFSP score ( $p < .025$ ). This finding indicated that for nondogmatic persons, the stimulus person was evaluated more favorably in relation to the S's self-rating when he agreed rather than disagreed, regardless of status. However, dogmatic persons evaluated the stimulus person favorably in relation to themselves only if he agreed and was high status.

It was concluded that both dogmatic and nondogmatic persons were responsive to status and disagreement but reacted to this information differently. Dogmatic individuals clearly demonstrated positive affect for the high status person and negative affect for the low status individual. Agreement by the stimulus person tended to reduce the difference in the evaluations of high and low status persons, but disagreement maximized this difference. Nondogmatic Ss were less affected by the status of the source in their evaluations of him and tended to reject a high status source. The measures of favorability and similarity were discussed in their relation to the process of attitude change.





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## INTRODUCTION

One of the best ways to analyze how people form perceptions of each other is to understand how different types of individuals perceive others. By observing how an individual makes judgments about another person, one can also infer information about the personality of the perceiver. It is generally accepted that one's perception of others is partly determined by the personality characteristics of the perceiver. Despite this assumption, previous research devoted directly to this topic has failed to identify the personality characteristics that are systematically related to how we perceive other persons (Tagiuri, 1969; Shrauger and Altrocchi, 1964).

In a review of the literature on the relationship between person perception and the personality of the judge, Shrauger and Altrocchi (1964) have observed that reliable personality correlates of trait attribution have been difficult to find. The research has failed to specify the influence of the interaction between the judge's personality and the nature of the interpersonal situation.

The purpose of this study was to examine how one personality characteristic, dogmatism, affected the judgements of a perceiver in an interpersonal situation. According to Rokeach, the defining characteristic of a "closed" or dogmatic individual is his inability to evaluate information objectively. He found that dogmatic persons were more susceptible to irrelevant pressures, such as a desire for power or a need to allay anxiety in evaluating interpersonal experiences. Rokeach has proposed that a relatively closed person



believes the world is a threatening place and so is unable to evaluate information independently of its source. For dogmatic people, "the power of authority does not depend on cognitive correctness, but on the ability of authority to mete out reward and punishment" (p. 62-63). By contrast, the nondogmatic individual is not simply persuaded by the status of the source but depends on the "cognitive correctness, accuracy, and consistency with other information he has about the world" (p. 63).

In this regard, Wright and Harvey (1965) have suggested that authoritarian Ss tend to conform on a judgemental task when the source has high prestige, but are likely to be non-conformists when the source is a person of low prestige.<sup>1</sup> Vidulich and Kaiman (1961) found that similar results also occurred for Ss high in dogmatism. Dogmatic Ss showed a greater conformity to a high prestige source than they did to a low prestige source, whereas individuals who had scored low on the Dogmatism scale were unaffected by his prestige.

There are a number of studies which have supported Rokeach's contention that dogmatic and nondogmatic persons differ in their ability to evaluate information on its own merits. These studies have demonstrated that dogmatism and authoritarianism are related to a need to restore balance in a condition of interpersonal

<sup>1</sup> Although Rokeach believes that dogmatism is a more general personality trait than authoritarianism, the evidence that exists appears to support the contention that these two measures are conceptually similar. Rokeach found the Dogmatism scale and the F scale to correlate from .54 to .77; Pettigrew (1958) has reported a correlation of .82.



disagreement (Crano & Sigal, 1968; Harvey, 1959; Harvey, 1962; Harvey & Beverly, 1961; Kelman & Eagly, 1965; McDavida, 1959; Steiner & Johnson, 1963; Vidulich & Kaiman, 1961; Wright & Harvey, 1965).

Harvey and Beverly (1961) exposed Ss to a message that contradicted their attitudes and which was believed to have been endorsed by a very high status source. They found that authoritarian individuals were more likely to conform to the view expressed in the message and showed less evidence of having understood the content of the speaker's message. It seems reasonable to conclude that the authoritarian individuals were reacting primarily to the authoritativeness of the source rather than to the evidence advanced in support of his arguments. Since the communications used in the research were not very complex, it does not seem likely that the failure to understand the source could be attributed directly to the nature of the arguments. In another study, Aronson, Turner and Carlsmith (1963) demonstrated that the degree of induced opinion change is a positive function of the discrepant communication only if the source is represented as a person of high credibility. In the case where the source is of low credibility, the discrepancy was resolved by derogating the source.

A variety of different responses to interpersonal disagreements have occurred (Steiner, 1966). Of particular interest is Harvey's finding (1962) that if highly authoritarian individuals were





confronted by a communication which was discrepant with beliefs about themselves, they kept their attitudes intact by minimizing the authoritativeness of the source, as well as by disbelieving that the source had been critical of them. In this study, authoritarians and nonauthoritarians were exposed to information about themselves which was unfavorable to their initial self-ratings completed at a previous session. The evaluations, which the Ss believed to have been made by either a friend or a relative stranger, included five levels of discrepancy with their initial self-ratings. The results suggested that authoritarian Ss were more disposed to keeping intact their initial attitudes towards self, than were nonauthoritarians. Further, in a recall task, administered after the final rating of the source, authoritarian individuals favorably distorted the discrepant evaluations of themselves by remembering that the message had not been critical of them. Authoritarianism correlated .33 ( $p < .01$ ) with the tendency to deny that the authoritative source had made negative ratings of them.

Steiner (1966), in his review of this research, concluded that authoritarianism and dogmatism, "predispose an individual to maintain amicable and supportive relationships with prestigious sources" (p. 228). Persons who scored high on the F scale were reluctant to reject a source with high influence and showed a tendency to underrecall or distort the nature of their disagreements with high status persons.

In most of the previous research, the authors have been interested in examining the impact of the source - message composite



on opinion change or distortion in the direction of the conclusion of the message. But what effect does the presentation of the composite have on the receiver's evaluation of the source? Although the dogmatic person manifests overt distortion of the nature of the disagreement and is susceptible to the influence of prestigious sources, can it be assumed that his perceptions of the source differ from those of the nondogmatic individual?

Although there has been more interest in these questions with the popularity of consistency theories (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1946; Osgood & Tannebaum, 1955), little evidence exists concerning how the personality of the perceiver is related to the perceptions of a target person. To investigate this relationship, the current study sought to determine how dogmatic and nondogmatic persons differ in the extent to which they perceive themselves to be similar to a target person.<sup>2</sup>

One theory which may be useful in understanding how dogmatic and nondogmatic persons differ in their impressions of a stimulus

<sup>2</sup>

Although this question appears to be important, the measure of assumed similarity (AS) or assumed dissimilarity (DS) has been the object of criticism (cf. Cronbach, 1958). He has argued that AS is a complex variable which can be specified into monadic ( $\bar{x}$ ,  $\sigma_x$ ,  $\bar{y}$ ,  $\sigma_y$ ) and dyadic ( $r_{xy}$   $\sigma_y/\sigma_x$ ) components of which only the latter truly reflects another's actual personality characteristics. Notwithstanding this distinction, the author is interested in the willingness of the Ss to generalize broadly on the basis of limited information. The measure of AS, then, whether dyadic (i.e., the description of the other person being dependent on the description of the self) or monadic (i.e., the AS score simply reflecting how persons differently describe themselves and the other person) is unimportant. Of interest is not whether dogmatic or nondogmatic persons make more accurate judgements about the "actual" other person, but only how the variable AS systematically differs in relationship to status and agreement.



person in an interpersonal situation involves "source" versus "message" orientation (Kelman and Eagly, 1965; McDavid, 1959). If a person is "message-oriented", he should assume himself to be dissimilar to a stimulus person who disagreed with him in a conversational situation. If, however, agreement existed on the target issue, the S should assume a high degree of similarity with the stimulus person. On the other hand, a person who could be described as "source-oriented", would be predisposed to assume greater similarity with a person who formed a member of his reference group. If the stimulus person fell outside of this reference group, the S should perceive him as dissimilar to himself. The critical difference between source and message-oriented persons is their propensity to use different cues in making evaluations of the stimulus person. A source-oriented individual would be responsive to differences in status but unresponsive to message discrepancy. By contrast, a message-oriented individual would be responsive to message discrepancy but unresponsive to the status differences of the stimulus person.

The present study sought to provide evidence for the contention that nondogmatic individuals are message-oriented rather than source-oriented with respect to their impressions of other persons. Although Rokeach does not present any hypothesis concerning how dogmatic persons will differ from nondogmatic persons in their perceptions of similarity to a target person, he has provided a theoretical basis on which it could be concluded that nondogmatic people evaluate a person on the basis of the merits of the





incongruous information presented. Dogmatic individuals, by contrast, would evaluate the stimulus person on the basis of criteria related to their personal needs and defenses. Thus, it was hypothesized that if disagreement existed on an issue of importance to the S, dogmatic people would be more likely to perceive the source as similar to themselves if he were highly credible. On the other hand, if the source lacked credibility, the dogmatic persons would devalue the stimulus person and see him as dissimilar to themselves. The nondogmatic persons should, however, be unaffected by the credibility of the source in their ratings of him.

Two corollary hypotheses concerning the extent to which Ss change their opinions to align themselves with or against the source and concerning the extent to which the Ss evaluate the stimulus person favorably were also offered. Since a person is not likely to derogate a communicator with whom he tends to identify, it was predicted that a favorable evaluation occurs in those conditions where the S assumes a high degree of similarity with the stimulus person. It was further predicted, in the case where the source is of low credibility, that dogmatic persons derogate the stimulus person as a means of denying that he is like him. With respect to opinion change for dogmatic individuals, when the stimulus person is high status the most change was expected, but if the stimulus person is of low status, little change should occur, irrespective of agreement. For nondogmatic individuals, maximum opinion change was predicted to occur in a disagreement condition, irrespective of the status of the source. These predictions are



consistent with Rokeach's notion that the amount of opinion change is not related to dogmatism per se, but that dogmatic and nondogmatic people change their attitudes in different ways.

To test the experimental hypothesis, the experiment was designed to simulate a condition of either total agreement or disagreement on some issue of importance to the individual. Deutsch and Gerard (1955), Schachter (1951) and Zimbardo (1960) have suggested that cognitive conflict is more readily tolerated if the content of the issue is trivial or unimportant. One aspect of a person's beliefs that is usually important is his values. The issue of values seems particularly appropriate because it is closely related to what extent a person makes judgements about other persons (Wertheimer, 1958). Values are highly cultural or socially dependent and as a result, the values of a person are often reflected in the group in which he has membership. Thus the degree to which a person accepts or rejects another person's value system is, in part, related to how similar he perceives himself to be to another individual. The current study, then, used values as a basis on which persons were to form impressions of others who varied: a) in status, b) in the extent of agreement with the S.

The hypotheses were:

1. Dogmatic persons perceive more similarity with the stimulus person when the source is represented as of high credibility, but less similarity where the source is of low credibility, irrespective of agreement.



2. On the other hand, nondogmatic persons perceive more similarity when the source is in agreement with them, but less similarity when the source disagrees with them, regardless of credibility.
3. The degree of favorableness of the evaluation of the stimulus person and opinion change is positively related to perceived similarity.



## METHOD

Subjects

Thirty-two male and thirty-two female students enrolled in the introductory psychology course at the University of Alberta served as Ss. Students in the course participated in the experiment for partial fulfillment of the course requirements. Ss who were selected for the experiment, were contacted by telephone on the basis of pre-test data concerning their views on six value statements (Appendix B) and their scores on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale (Appendix A).

Of the six statements, the three which the Ss rated as most important to them were used in the study: hedonism, integrity and other-directedness. Since the hypotheses concerned "agreement or disagreement with an issue of importance to the S", only those persons who rated both the importance and the extent of agreement with the target issue as at least 5 on a 7 point linear scale, were selected as Ss (cf. Appendix D).

Of the initial population of 255 students, 200 persons met these criteria. From these students, 50 dogmatic and 50 nondogmatic Ss were chosen from the upper and lower fourths of the distribution. The final selection of 64 Ss was achieved by balancing the remaining population into an equal number of males and females, and then randomly selecting the S group. The resulting distribution revealed a range of scores for the dogmatic Ss from 165 to 213 ( $\bar{X} = 185$ ,  $s = 12.9$ ) and a range from 87 to 134 ( $\bar{X} = 116$ ,  $s = 11.7$ ) for the nondogmatic Ss. These distributions were comparable to the sample statistics on





which the Dogmatism Scale was based (Rokeach, 1960).

The components of the pre-test data are presented in four tables. Three of these (Tables 1, 2 and 3) are presented in Appendix H. The first table presents the original data of the total number of Ss who rated each value statement as being most important. Table 2 presents the number of male and female Ss in the three most important communication groups. This table is divided into two parts, one representing the Ss who met the criteria of selection and the other, those who did not. Table 3 presents the distribution of dogmatic and nondogmatic males and females in each communication group.

The final distribution of Ss used in the experiment is shown in Table 4 below.

Table 4

| Issue          | Males | Nondogmatic |       | Males | Dogmatic |       |
|----------------|-------|-------------|-------|-------|----------|-------|
|                |       | Females     | Total |       | Females  | Total |
| Other-Directed | 8     | 5           | 13    | 7     | 7        | 14    |
| Integrity      | 3     | 5           | 8     | 5     | 4        | 9     |
| Hedonism       | 5     | 6           | 11    | 4     | 5        | 9     |
| Total          | 16    | 16          | 32    | 16    | 16       | 32    |

#### Sampling Bias

Inspection of the data revealed that males are generally more dogmatic than females. However, the value statement chosen by the S as most important, was not different for males and females. Ss who did not participate in the experiment because of a failure to meet the selection criteria were not differently distributed with regards to dogmatism, sex or issue.



## Materials

### Personality Measure

Form E of the Dogmatism scale is designed to measure to what extent a person's belief system is "open" or "closed" (Rokeach, 1960). The D scale consists of 40 items, each item being scored on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating a low level of dogmatism and 7 a high level.

### Values

To obtain judgements about people's values, Wertheimer's six value statements (1957) were used (Appendix B). These values each expressed in a single sentence without the label are Approval (A), Authoritarianism (F), Hedonism (H), Integrity (I), Other-directedness (O), and Status (S). Each S ranked the six statements in the order of how important they were to him. He then rated the most important statement on a 7 point scale with regard to how important it was to him and to what extent he agreed with it (Appendix D).

### Stimulus Material

Six communications were written, two concerning each of the following statements: integrity, hedonism and other-directedness (Appendix C). The content was written in the form of a dialogue between the E and another S, actually a confederate. After a brief introduction, the E presented a series of questions designed to assess the "confederate's views" towards the target statement. The confederate either took a position of total agreement or total disagreement with the value statement. The arguments were carefully



balanced with regard to ad hominem appeal, "A person who believes x does not give a damn about others"; personal commitment, "I personally find it important to believe in x"; logical persuasion, "If x then y"; and definitive assertion, "x is y".

Each communication was introduced by a short dialogue which affirmed that the confederate had heard the S's opinions concerning the target issue and that he was prepared to answer similar and related questions (See the Introduction in Appendix C). The complete dialogues between the confederate and the E, including the introductions, were pre-recorded on a SONY monaural tape recorder. The length of a single conversation varied from four to six minutes. Appendix C presents a complete script for all the communication conditions.

#### Status Information

The status of the stimulus person was manipulated by creating two personality profiles which differed in their relative expertise. The background material not directly related to academic success of the stimulus person was the same for both profiles. The high expertise individual was presented as highly intelligent, with special training in group processes and value formation. The low expertise stimulus person was presented as having no particular capacity for academic achievement and with no interest or ambition in intellectual activity. The length of the communication, which was handwritten and purported to have been prepared by the stimulus person, was from 150 to 200 words. The complete background sketches





of these persons are contained in Appendix G.

### Evaluation Measures

To determine the degree of assumed similarity the Ss perceived to exist between themselves and the stimulus person, all Ss were asked to respond to an item questionnaire concerned with personality attributes: (1) The S perceived the stimulus person to have, (2) The S perceived himself to have, and (3) The S perceived the stimulus person to have about the S.

Ss were also asked to rate the stimulus person's arguments with regard to logic, fairness, informedness and interest. An item designed to assess the extent to which Ss changed their opinions on the value statement was included. All dependent measures are presented in Appendix E.

### Procedure

On arriving at the experimental room, the Ss were seated at a rectangular table in a small waiting room and given experimental credit at the start of the session. During this time, Ss were made to feel at ease by being asked about their course interests at the University.

The E began the experiment with the following instructions:

Today, it is of special importance to us, as social scientists, to be able to determine how people make judgements about each other in certain situations. For example, in clinical settings or job interviews, a person is asked to form an impression about another individual on the basis of a relatively restricted amount of information.

Research which has been conducted in the past has shown that certainly some people make better judgements than others. Of particular interest



to us is how people go about forming impressions of each other on first meeting. At today's session, in order to better understand the process of impression formation, we are going to ask you to form an impression of another person.

A number of different variables have been shown to be directly related to impression formation under these conditions. One factor of importance, especially in conditions of first meeting, is personal appearance. Now since this is a difficult factor to control, we have decided to eliminate its influence.

For the purposes of this experiment, two adjacent rooms have been set up so that all communication will be via an intercom and there will be no visual contact.

The remaining variable that is most important in interpersonal impressions - the nature of the issues that are discussed by the parties - will, then, be the basis on which we would like you to form your impressions of the other person. In this regard, a number of statements about how people feel about themselves and others have been selected. An issue that we found to be important to people is (1/H/O).<sup>3</sup>

At this time the Ss were given Wertheimer's six value statements (Appendix B) and the chosen value statement was read aloud to them. The E then gave these instructions:

For the purpose of this experiment, I am going to ask the other person (B) a number of questions about his beliefs concerning this statement (1/H/O). Your task is to listen very carefully to his responses to my questions and form a general impression of him on this basis. All that is required then, is that you listen to our conversation to form your impressions of the other person. Are there any questions?

Let us proceed then by first showing you the experimental room.

The Ss then followed the E into a small room, where he was seated at another table on which had been placed a microphone,

<sup>3</sup> (1/H/O) The appropriate value statement (integrity, hedonism or other-directedness) was presented.



amplifier, and speaker. The E proceeded by familiarizing the S with the operation and purposes of the equipment. During this time, The E turned on the amplifier and demonstrated the sensitivity of the microphone. The E then continued with the following instructions:

Since your impressions of the other person (B) with respect to his answers to my questions on the issue being discussed today, will be affected by whether or not you agree or disagree with the statement, I would like you to consider what your position would be. While you do so, I will go into the other room and see that the other person is ready to begin the interview. I will be back in a few moments.

Approximately one to two minutes later the E returned with B's background sketch (Appendix G) and said:

Before we start, I have had the other person prepare a brief background sketch about himself which I would like you to read. The information that it contains may be of some help to you in forming an impression of the other person.

The Ss were then given time to familiarize themselves with the contents of the sketch. After the S had studied the description, the E continued by returning to the value statement and asking a series of questions designed to have the S reveal his position with respect to the issue (These questions were similar and related to the questions presented in Appendix C). The E then continued:

Let us begin the interview with the other person. I am going into the other room to ask the other person a number of similar and related questions concerning his views on this statement. Now I want you to listen very carefully to his answers and form a general impression of what that person is like. Are there any questions?

The E then left the room and from an adjoining chamber played a prepared tape designed to simulate an actual interview situation.





On termination of the tape, the E returned to the S with a questionnaire (Appendix E) and asked the S to complete the required information on the basis of any content that he had received or could infer from the interview. The S was assured that his answers and ratings would be kept strictly confidential. The E then asked the S to be as frank and thoughtful as possible in all his ratings.

After the Ss had finished completing the questionnaire, they were asked a series of questions which attempted to assess if they had understood the task and to relate what they thought the experiment was about (Appendix F). Finally the Ss were told the nature of the hypotheses and were thanked for participating in the experiment.





## RESULTS

To test the hypotheses, several dependent measures were examined. These included three measures of similarity, a personality similarity score (PS), a value similarity score (VS), and an assumed similarity score (AS); three measures of favorability, the degree of favorability towards the stimulus person (FSP), the degree of favorability towards the stimulus person's arguments (FSA), and a measure of the difference in the favorability of the self and the stimulus person's descriptions (DFSP); and a measure of the value change (VC).

Of the total number of Ss, three were excluded from the analysis: two because of suspicion and one because of an E's error with regards to feedback of an inappropriate communication condition. Prior to the analysis of the dependent measures, a number of checks were done to determine if there were artifacts in the data. All summary tables of the analyses are presented in Appendix H.

### Sex Differences

To check for the possibility of sex differences in perceived similarity with a male stimulus person, a t-test analysis was used to decide if the mean similarity (AS) score differed for males and females. The AS score was determined directly from an item asking Ss to rate the extent to which they believed themselves to be similar to the stimulus person. The nonsignificant results ( $t = 0.36$ ,  $df = 63$ ) indicated that the AS score was unaffected by the sex of the Ss. See Table 4 for a summary of the analysis.



### Communication Differences

An analysis of variance was used to determine if there were differences in the effectiveness of the communication. These results are summarized in Table 5. The analysis revealed no significant differences between the three communication conditions with respect to the extent to which the Ss agreed or disagreed with the stimulus person's arguments ( $F = 0.38$ ,  $df = 2/61$ ).

Furthermore, an analysis of variance was carried out to determine if there were differences in how informed, interesting, fair and logical the arguments were perceived to be in the different communication conditions. The four descriptive items were summed to evaluate how favorably the Ss had rated the arguments. These results, summarized in Table 6, yielded no significant differences ( $F = 2.06$ ,  $df = 2/61$ ).

### Description Differences

To assess the differences in how dogmatic and nondogmatic persons describe themselves or others, separate analyses were done. The indices were based on nine adjective items descriptive of the self and other person (e.g., intelligence, creativity, etc.) The results of the analyses indicated that dogmatic and nondogmatic persons did not differ in how they described themselves ( $t = 0.66$ ,  $df = 63$ ) or how they described the stimulus person ( $t = 0.27$ ,  $df = 63$ ). These results are reported in Table 7.

It was concluded from the preliminary analysis that no significant differences could be found with regard to how dogmatic and nondogmatic persons describe themselves, the stimulus person or the stimulus person's arguments. The sex of the S did not affect the



ratings of similarity with a male stimulus person.

In the analyses of the major dependent measures, sixty-four Ss were included, 8 per cell. Scores for each variable were based on a 7 point scale, with one representing an unfavorable and seven a favorable evaluation. The results were analyzed using a complete  $2 \times 2 \times 2$  factorial design with equal replications which included two levels of status, two levels of dogmatism and either agreement or disagreement assigned between Ss. In all, there were seven dependent measures which were separately examined using the analysis of variance technique.

#### Personality Similarity (PS) Score

The major dependent variable was the degree of similarity between the description of the self and the stimulus person (PS). The description scores were determined from nine items used to describe both the self and the other person (eg. sincerity, intelligence, etc.) The PS score was obtained by computing the absolute difference between the S's self-description score and the description of the stimulus person.<sup>4</sup>

In the agreement condition, it was found that Ss evaluated themselves as being more similar to the stimulus person than when the stimulus person disagreed with them ( $F = 19.93$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The mean PS score for Ss who agreed with the stimulus person was  $\bar{X} = 19.0$ ,

<sup>4</sup> All the original dissimilarity scores were transposed to similarity scores by giving the largest dissimilarity score a value of 1 and appropriately adjusting the remaining scores.






and for those who disagreed was  $\bar{X} = 14.3$ . The dogmatism x status interaction yielded an interesting and highly significant finding. In the low status condition, nondogmatic persons as opposed to dogmatic Ss, rated the source as more similar to themselves. However, in the high status condition, the reverse was true. Dogmatic Ss rated the source as more similar to themselves than did the nondogmatic Ss ( $F = 9.95$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The mean PS scores for this interaction are presented in Figure 1. The summary of the analysis of variance is reported in Table 8.

Figure 1

Dogmatism x Status Interaction Effect on the  
Personality Similarity (PS) Scores



#### Value Similarity (VS) Score

The VS score was determined by computing the absolute difference between the S's rating of his most important value statement




and the rating of this statement attributed to the stimulus person.<sup>5</sup>

The analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect for agreement. A stimulus person who agreed with the S was rated as having more similar values than one who disagreed with the S ( $F = 11.85$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The mean VS scores were  $\bar{X} = 5.2$  and  $\bar{X} = 4.0$  for agreement and disagreement respectively. The dogmatism x status interaction failed to attain significance, although the direction of the interaction score was consistent with the personality similarity measure ( $F = 3.58$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .10$ ). Figure 2 presents the dogmatism x status interaction. Table 9 contains a summary of the analysis of variance.

Figure 2

Dogmatism x Status Interaction Effect on the  
Value Similarity (VS) Scores






### Assumed Similarity (AS) Score

The AS score was represented by the absolute value of the rating assigned to an item which asked the S to rate how similar he believed he was to the stimulus person. The AS score, consistent with the personality and value similarity scores, yielded a significant main effect for agreement ( $F = 132.73$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The mean AS score for agreement was  $\bar{X} = 5.6$  and for disagreement was  $\bar{X} = 2.6$ . Like the value similarity measure, the AS score yielded a nonsignificant dogmatism x status interaction, although the direction and the magnitude of the  $F$  value was consistent with the personality similarity score ( $F = 3.85$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .10$ ). Figure 3 presents the dogmatism x status interaction. See Table 10 for the summary of these analyses.

Figure 3

Dogmatism x Status Interaction Effect on the  
Assumed Similarity (AS) Scores






### Degree of Favorability Towards the Stimulus Person (FSP)

The FSP score was calculated by summing all ten items which were descriptive of the stimulus person (eg. intelligence, creativity, etc.) The items were rated on a 7 point scale where one represented an unfavorable and seven a favorable evaluation. The FSP score yielded a significant main effect for agreement. If the stimulus person agreed with the S, he was rated more favorably than if he disagreed with the S ( $F = 53.9$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The mean level of FSP was  $\bar{X} = 55.7$  for the agreement condition and  $\bar{X} = 43.9$  for the disagreement condition. A significant main effect for status was also found. If the stimulus person was high status, he was rated more favorably than if he was low status ( $F = 15.7$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The

Figure 4

Dogmatism x Status Interaction Effect of the Favorability Towards the Stimulus Person Score (FSP)







means for the FSP scores were  $\bar{X} = 53.0$  and  $\bar{X} = 46.6$  for high and low status respectively. The dogmatism x status interaction was significant ( $F = 20.7$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .01$ ). This interaction is shown in Figure 4. The results revealed that nondogmatic Ss evaluated the source more favorably than did dogmatic Ss if the source was low status. On the other hand, if the source was high status, dogmatic persons rated him more favorably than did nondogmatic persons.

Furthermore, a significant status x agreement interaction was found ( $F = 4.9$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .05$ ). See Figure 5 for this interaction. This finding indicated that the difference in the favorableness of the evaluations of the stimulus person on the basis of agreement or disagreement was less under high than low status conditions. A low status individual was rated less favorably than a high status person in the disagreement condition but status did not affect the favorability ratings of a stimulus person who agreed with the S. A summary of the analyses is presented in Table 11.

#### Differences in the Favorability of the Self and Stimulus Person Descriptions (DFSP)

The DFSP score was derived from the difference between the descriptive ratings of the self and the stimulus person. The ratings of the self were subtracted from the ratings of the other person to determine if the rating of the stimulus person was favorable or unfavorable in relation to the rating of the self.<sup>6</sup> The items used


<sup>6</sup> To avoid negative values in the analysis of the DFSP scores, all the values were transformed to positive dissimilarity scores by assigning a value of 1 to the largest negative score. The values were then converted to similarity scores by a procedure described previously (cf. footnote #4).



in this analysis were the same as those in the personality similarity scores.

Figure 5

Agreement x Status Interaction Effect of the Favorability Towards the Stimulus Person Score (FSP)




The results revealed significant main effects for agreement ( $F = 24.45$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .01$ ) and status ( $F = 13.60$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .01$ ). If the stimulus person agreed with the S, he rated the stimulus person as more favorable in relation to himself than if he disagreed with the S. The means were  $\bar{X} = 22.6$  and  $\bar{X} = 15.2$  for agreement and disagreement respectively. Also, if the stimulus person was high status, he was rated as more favorable in relation to the S's self-rating, than if the stimulus person were low status. The mean DFSP score for high status was  $\bar{X} = 21.6$  and for low status was  $\bar{X} = 16.1$ . A significant dogmatism x status interaction indicated that dogmatic persons rated the high status stimulus person more favorably in relation to themselves



than did the nondogmatic Ss. However, the nondogmatic Ss rated the low status source as more favorable in relation to themselves than did the dogmatic Ss. ( $F = 7.88$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .01$ ). Figure 6 presents this interaction.

Figure 6

Dogmatism x Status Interaction Effect on the Differences  
in the Favorability of the Self and Stimulus Person Descriptions  
(DFSP)



The triple interaction was also significant ( $F = 6.97$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .025$ ). The means suggested that for nondogmatic persons, the stimulus person was evaluated more favorably in relation to himself when he agreed than when he disagreed, regardless of status. However, for dogmatic Ss, the stimulus person was evaluated slightly more favorably in relation to himself in the agreement condition if he was high rather than low status but was rated unfavorably in the disagreement condition only if he was low status. Figure 7 presents






this triple interaction. A summary of the results is reported in Table 12.

Figure 7

Dogmatism x Status x Agreement Interaction Effect  
of the Differences in the Favorability Towards  
Self and Stimulus Person (DFSP)



#### Degree of Favorability Towards the Stimulus Person's Arguments (FSA)

The FSA score was derived by adding all the items that were unfavorably or favorably descriptive of the stimulus person's arguments (eg., logical, fair, informed, etc.). This analysis revealed two significant main effects. Arguments which agreed with the S's position were rated more favorably than arguments which disagreed with the S's position ( $F = 47.98$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The mean ratings were  $\bar{X} = 22.4$  for agreement and  $\bar{X} = 17.6$  for disagreement. Also, arguments which were presented by a high status source were



evaluated more favorably than arguments which were made by a low status source ( $F = 8.74$ ,  $df = 1/56$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The mean ratings for high and low status persons were  $\bar{X} = 21.2$  and  $\bar{X} = 18.9$  respectively. A summary of the analyses of variance is reported in Table 13.

#### Value Change (VC)

The VC score was determined by calculating a difference measure between the pre and post ratings of the value statement. No significant results were found with regard to value change as a dependent measure. Table 14 reports a summary of the analysis of variance.

#### Correlations

The correlations between value change and the other dependent measures were not significant. Table 15 presents the results of the correlation data. Since the value change data were relatively homogeneous, it was not surprising that the correlations failed to meet traditional levels of significance.



## Discussion

The main purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between dogmatism and the perception of a stimulus person who varied in status and presented either similar or discrepant information on a value statement of central importance to the Ss. The hypothesis that nondogmatic persons would be primarily message-oriented and form their impressions on the basis of the content of the communication whereas dogmatic individuals would be source-oriented and form their impressions of the stimulus person primarily on the basis of status, was only partially confirmed. Only one of the two predicted interactions was significant. Additional information relevant to the results was provided by a significant triple interaction for the DFSP score. This score reflected the extent to which the ratings of the stimulus person were favorable in relation to the S's self-description. The relevant finding indicated that while nondogmatic persons evaluated the stimulus person on the basis of the discrepant communication, without regard to status, dogmatic Ss rated a low status person who disagreed with them more unfavorably than persons in any other condition. The expected responsiveness to status for dogmatic persons occurred only when the source disagreed with the Ss. However, incongruous information was not ignored or disregarded in the dogmatic person's evaluations of the stimulus person. The dogmatic Ss tended to minimize the differences between high and low status persons in the agreement condition, but maximize the differences in the disagreement condition.

This finding indicates that message discrepancy interacted with status to produce "assimilation" and "contrast" effects. Although the





assimilation-contrast "social judgment" approach to attitudes (Hovland, Harvey and Sherif, 1957) was originally formulated to understand how discrepancy affects the perceived position of a message on the attitude continuum, Berkowitz (1960) has suggested that interpersonal perceptions are affected in a similar manner. When the source was low status, disagreement decreased the ratings of perceived similarity to the stimulus person more in dogmatic than nondogmatic individuals (contrast effect). However, if the source was high status, the discrepancy induced dogmatic individuals to rate the stimulus person as more similar to themselves than did nondogmatic persons (assimilation effect). These effects are all the more remarkable when it is considered that at least one of the target statements used in the study is a cultural truism and all are important and positively valenced in the S's belief system.

The data clearly demonstrated that dogmatism disposed Ss towards very different perceptions in relation to persons high and low in status: toward similarity to a person with high status and dissimilarity toward a low status person. There was a propensity for dogmatic individuals to evaluate high status persons as similar and favorable regardless of whether agreement or disagreement existed on the target issue. By contrast, if the stimulus person was low status, he was evaluated as unfavorable and dissimilar.

Although the dogmatic individuals clearly favored the high status source, nondogmatic Ss were either unresponsive to status differences or evaluated themselves to be more similar to the low status person. The assumed similarity (AS) score, the value similarity (VS) score and the favorability ratings of the stimulus person (FSP), all





revealed that nondogmatic Ss were not affected by the status of the stimulus person in their ratings of him.

However, two exceptions, the personality similarity (PS) score and the extent to which the ratings of the other person were favorable or unfavorable in relation to the self-description (DFSP), revealed that nondogmatic persons rated themselves as more similar and favorable, to the low status person.<sup>7</sup> A similar result has also been noted by Vidulich and Kaiman (1961) who found that nondogmatic persons were slightly more favorably impressed by a message attributed to a source of low prestige. One interesting implication of this finding is that nondogmatic persons relate to different reference groups within our society. If so, it could be that nondogmatic persons are rejecting a culturally defined norm of deference to an authoritative or high status person.

Although the hypotheses of this study received little empirical support, a consistent pattern of results emerged. The experimental manipulation of status and agreement differences clearly affected the S's ratings of the stimulus person and his arguments. Within all the interaction data describing the stimulus person, dogmatic persons reacted positively towards the influence of a high status source. Nondogmatic Ss were either unaffected by status differences or favorable towards the low status person. However, both dogmatic and

<sup>7</sup> The DFSP and PS scores are related in that they both include the same items. However, the DFSP score assessed whether the ratings of the stimulus person were favorable (positive) or unfavorable (negative) in relation to the self-ratings, whereas the PS score reflected only the absolute difference between the self and stimulus person ratings.



nondogmatic persons were responsive to the agreement or disagreement of the message.

The effect of status and message discrepancy on the evaluations of similarity and favorability presented in this study are not altogether consistent with related research in attitude change. Studies by Pepitone (1958); Hovland, Janis and Kelley (1953) and Aronson, Turner and Carlsmith (1963) have indicated that conformity is greatest if the source of the discrepant information is highly credible. Similarly, Kelman and Eagly (1965) have found that Ss who received incongruent messages from a highly credible and attractive source perceived him as being more supportive of their views than he actually was. Manis (1961) has reported that Ss tended to minimize the extent to which a discrepant communication disagreed with their expressed opinions when the source was high status. Also, Bergin (1962) and Aronson, Turner and Carlsmith (1963) have demonstrated that when the source had low credibility, greater discrepancy enhanced Ss resistance toward change in the direction advocated in the communication. These findings confirm the notion that disagreement results in a low status person being regarded less favorably than a high status person. However, when Ss were considered irrespective of dogmatism, only in one instance were high status persons more favorably evaluated than low status persons. This effect occurred in the ratings of favorability of the stimulus person (FSP) and showed that the high status source is somewhat more favorable if he agrees rather than disagrees but the low status source is much more unfavorable if he disagrees rather than agrees. This result supports



the idea that status differences affect the evaluations of the stimulus person when the information he presents is incongruent but not when that information is congruent with the S's beliefs.

In most of the previous attitude change research, Ss were susceptible to the persuasion effects of a high status source. It was concluded that high status served to qualitatively distort the nature of the discrepancy. In the one confirming instance reported in this study, Ss reacted to status differences only in the disagreement condition. Furthermore, the high status person was not evaluated as similar and favorable by the nondogmatic Ss. Only the dogmatic Ss were consistently positive in their evaluations of the high status person regardless of disagreement.

The evaluations of the stimulus person's arguments were not differently distorted by nondogmatic and dogmatic persons. The results indicated that arguments which agreed with the S's position, as well as those presented by a high status source, were evaluated as more fair, logical, interesting and informed. In this regard, Dietrich (1946), Hovland and Sherif (1957) and McKillop (1952) have found that discrepancy affected the quality of perception but not how much of the message was received. It appears that strong demand characteristics for agreement and high status affect both the perception of the favorability of the source as well as the quality of his arguments.

The hypothesis that value change would be primarily influenced by the status of the source for dogmatic Ss and message discrepancy for nondogmatic Ss was not confirmed. There were no significant







differences between dogmatic and nondogmatic persons with respect to value change. This result is not particularly surprising because studies that have found a relationship between dogmatism or authoritarianism and opinion change when the source is high status, have done so only when the issue is of moderate importance (Wright and Harvey, 1965). However, a person's values are both a stable part of his personality (McCord, 1958) and probably intricately related to his self-concept. There is also some evidence which has suggested that source derogation and attitude change are alternate modes of handling incongruous input (McGuire, 1968). Steiner (1966) has noted that when these responses are both available alternatives, the former is more often exercised. If this is the case, there may be no need to change one's values if the option of derogating the source is possible. Also, it can be argued that since the communications were not designed to persuade the S but only to agree or disagree with his opinions, there may have been little motivation towards value change.

One implication of the current research is that dogmatism is related to different perceptions of others. The dogmatic person appears to evaluate another person on the basis of external criteria. His perceptions are susceptible to pressure by "desirable goals." It appears then, that the perceptions of similarity are a consistent part of the cognitive style that Rokeach has defined as part of the dogmatic personality.



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## APPENDIX A

ROKEACH'S DOGMATISM SCALE  
(FORM E)Instructions:

We would like to know your opinions on the following list of statements. Please read each sentence and indicate whether you agree or disagree with it. If you agree, indicate how much by circling the appropriate number.

- +1 mildly agree
- +2 agree
- +3 strongly agree

If you disagree, indicate how much by circling the appropriate number.

- 1 mildly disagree
- 2 disagree
- 3 strongly disagree

If you neither agree or disagree, then circle "0".



|     |   |    |    |    |   |   |   |   |
|-----|---|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|
| 1.  | The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.   | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 2.  | The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent                 | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 3.  | Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups. | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 4.  | It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.                          | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 5.  | Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.  | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 6.  | Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.   | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 7.  | Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.  | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 8.  | I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.  | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 9.  | It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future  | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 10. | There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.   | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 11. | Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.   | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 12. | In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.  | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |



- |  |    |    |    |   |   |   |   |
|--|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|
| 13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.     | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 14. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.   | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare. | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.  | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 17. If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to the world.  | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 18. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of really great thinkers.  | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 19. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of things they stand for.   | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 20. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.   | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 21. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.  | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.                                   | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.                                | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |





- |     |  |    |    |    |   |   |   |   |
|-----|--|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|
| 24. | To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.  | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 25. | When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from the way we do.            | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 26. | In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness   | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 27. | The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same thing he does.  | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 28. | In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than those in the opposing camp. | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 29. | A group which tolerates too many differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.   | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 30. | There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.  | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 31. | My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.   | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 32. | A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.  | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 33. | Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.   | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |



34. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted. -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
35. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects. -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
36. In the long run, the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own. -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
37. The present is all too often of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts. -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
38. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life, it is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all." -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on. -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
40. Most people just don't know what's good for them. -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3



## APPENDIX B

## WERTHEIMER'S VALUE STATEMENTS

(A) One should act in such a way that people will like one, so that one makes friends wherever one goes.

(H) One should act in such a way as to get as much pleasure and satisfaction out of life as possible.

(O) One should be kind to others respecting the dignity and worth of every individual, and acting in a warm and helpful way towards others.

(F) One should follow the advice of wiser and more experienced people, who have led worthwhile lives.

(I) One should satisfy one's own conscience and make decisions one believes are right, regardless of whether one hurts oneself or others.

(S) One should act in such a way as to make the most of oneself, in order to earn the respect of others.



APPENDIX C  
COMMUNICATIONS

Introduction:

Ques: How are you today?

Ans: Fine.

Ques: Were you able to hear our conversation clearly?

Ans: Yes, it was clear.

Ques: Now I want you to be able to answer some questions I have just asked in the conversation you were listening to. You have had some time to prepare your answers so I expect you will be able to answer them without any problems. (Pause) O.K., let us begin. I will first read the statement and then proceed with the questions.

Ans: O.K.





Other-directed Agree

Ques: Do you find it personally important to be warm and helpful to others?

Ans: Yes, I believe that my relationships with other people are the most important things in the world. I want very much to accept other people and have them accept me. Life would not have any meaning without friends.

Ques: Should we act with compassion towards all people?

Ans: Well, what we do and should do are often two different things. I would agree, ideally, that I would like to act with compassion towards others. I think that if I respect a person as an individual he will return that respect. All people, in spite of what they have learned, require certain things. One of these is a feeling of self-worth. All people must respect each other in terms of their complete personalities.

Ques: Why do you find it important to treat people in a warm and helpful way?

Ans: Well, I feel you have to accept people unconditionally. You cannot just accept them because they conform to your expectations. It is only when you oppress and treat people with contempt that they display violence against each other.

Ques: What would happen if people did not respect each other and act with consideration to others?

Ans: If all people respected each other's rights, no person would feel he had to protect them. When people are forced to defend their



unalienable rights they will react with aggression to protect themselves. Consequently, I think the survival of our planet depends on acting in a warm and helpful way towards others.

### Other-directed Disagree

Ques: Do you agree that all people should be treated with kindness and respect.

Ans: I don't think that all individuals are deserving of consideration and respect. If one acts in a warm and helpful way just to anyone, he is likely to be taken advantage of very easily. One should respect the worth of those individuals who are deserving. Before you extend your friendship to someone, you should have some indication of what that person is like.

Ques: Why should not all people be treated in a warm and helpful way?

Ans: Well, if you act with warmth and kindness to everyone you are only going to give encouragement to people who don't deserve it. People who are immoral will only be reinforced for their undesirable behavior. They will be rewarded for their evil and undesirable behavior and so go on doing it. One cannot simply and indiscriminantly accept all people's behavior. Being warm and kind to just anyone is as much as giving your approval to lawlessness and disorder.

Ques: How do you know if someone is worth the kind consideration you give them?



Ans: Well, you have to observe their behavior. People must demonstrate their worth before I accept them. They must prove that they are morally responsible to receive kindness and trust. People who are always trying to act with warmth and kindness to everyone must have some hidden feelings of shame about their own self-worth.

### Integrity Agree

Ques: Do you believe that it is important to have a clear conscience?

Ans: Yes, I think so. When I am honest with myself, I believe that it is important to have a clear conscience - even if it means hurting someone else or for that matter myself. I think that conscience is one of the highest values. A person should live his life by the highest ideals.

Ques: Can you think of a situation where you have had to hurt someone else to have a clear conscience?

Ans: Well, I think that if I had a very important decision to make, concerning say, my future and this decision was opposed to someone who was close to me, I would have to make that decision anyway. In hurting someone else I would also hurt myself. But I think that I have to live my own life and not try to meet all the expectations of other persons.

Ques: What do you think of people who don't have a clear conscience?

Ans: I believe that if you don't have a clear conscience you will be taken advantage of very easily. If a person does not satisfy himself as to what is right, but lets others do it for him, he





is very shallow. People must make decisions even though others believe that it is wrong.

Ques: To what extent do you think having a clear conscience hurts others?

Ans: I think that if you have a good conscience your decisions will not hurt others. People who have no conscience are those who make decisions with no regard for others. People who have a clear conscience always hurt themselves when their decisions hurt others.

### Integrity Disagree

Ques: Do you believe that it is important to have a clear conscience?

Ans: No, people who are always concerned with having a clear conscience are too uptight to enjoy life. They are always worried about doing the "right" thing and what other people think.

Ques: What do you think is a higher value than conscience?

Ans: Well, I believe in doing what I want, whether it is right or wrong. You have to let go a little, live your life to the fullest extent. Who believes in being controlled by the artificial restraints of society?

Ques: Why is it not important to you to have a clear conscience?

Ans: Having a clear conscience is like having your mind made up before any situation arises. You have to look at the evidence of every situation. No two situations are identical. So, it is not important to me to be compulsive about consistency.



Ques: What is an alternative to having a clear conscience?

Ans: Life itself! Conscience is only in the minds of middle class people who make up our society. It is an attempt to restrain persons from gaining control over the people who oppress them. You do such and such which threatens the status quo and then society labels it immoral and wrong. Conscience is a way of enslaving people.

### H (Hedonism) Agree

Ques: Do you agree that one should get as much pleasure and satisfaction out of life as possible?

Ans: Yes, personally I feel that one should get as much pleasure and satisfaction out of life as possible because most of the time we are surrounded with unhappiness and misery. Since life is hard and there is so little of it, one must take pleasure where one finds it.

I think that one should indulge in as many and as great a variety of pleasurable experiences as possible, the only restriction being that one does not hurt others.

Ques: What do you think about people who attempt to inhibit pleasure and satisfaction?

Ans: Rules that prevent free expression of feelings are made by individuals too uptight to enjoy themselves. I believe in letting go, in forgetting to be completely rational - to let my feelings and emotions determine my behavior.

People are afraid of the pleasures of life. They believe chaos



would result. But chaos is a result of not allowing people to express themselves freely.

People don't experience satisfaction out of what they do in life. A person should get satisfaction out of his work, but most people don't.

I am concerned that people do not receive enough satisfaction from the things they do. The world can be a pretty cold place. It is often too controlled to allow people to live to the fullest extent.

#### H (Hedonism) Disagree

Ques: Do you think that one should act in such a way as to get as much pleasure and satisfaction out of life as possible?

Ans: No, I hardly think that one should lead a life without restraint. By taking your pleasures where you find them you only encourage immorality and indecency.

Ques: What then, is an alternative to giving in to leading a life of unrestrained pleasure?

Ans: Rather than attempting to get as much pleasure and satisfaction out of life as possible I live in moderation. I am concerned with self-control, and careful consideration of all my actions. A person should be concerned about the future as well as the present. Our world would be totally chaotic if there were no suitable restrictions on a person's behavior.

Ques: What do you think of people who try to get as much pleasure and satisfaction out of life as possible?



Ans: A person who attempts to maximize his pleasure in all situations doesn't give a damn about other people. This is true because he is using people for his own benefit, in so doing, he offends the rights of others.

Ques: What things do you value in your life?

Ans: There are other things in life besides pleasure and satisfaction. I believe happiness and love are not simply obtained through some process of immediate gratification. The trust that is built up between people is a result of living your life by the highest ideals. Often I have suffered for the valuable experiences in life - by denying pleasure and satisfaction. Too many people are controlled by their need for pleasure. Lawlessness and chaos are inevitable results.





## APPENDIX D

## PRE-TEST ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE

A. Appendix B has written on it six statements, each one with a letter assigned beside it. Read each carefully and fill in the letters in the proper spaces below in the order of how important they are to you.

1. \_\_\_\_\_ statement judged to be most important
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_
4. \_\_\_\_\_
5. \_\_\_\_\_
6. \_\_\_\_\_ statement judged to be least important

B. Now, for the statement you have selected as being most important, rate its importance by circling the appropriate number.

|            |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |           |
|------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--|--|-----------|
| not at all |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  | very      |
| important  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |  |  | important |

C. Rate the statement you have selected as being most important with respect to how much you agree or disagree with it by circling the appropriate number.

|       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |          |
|-------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--|----------|
| agree |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  | disagree |
|       | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |  |          |



# APPENDIX E

## IMPRESSION QUESTIONNAIRE

Following are a number of questions concerning your impressions of the other person in the interview (B). Try to answer all the questions as accurately as you can. (Circle your choice).

### PART I:

Your task is to rate the six statements in order of how important you feel the various statements are to B. (Fill in the appropriate letter).

1. \_\_\_\_\_ statement judged most important
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_
4. \_\_\_\_\_
5. \_\_\_\_\_
6. \_\_\_\_\_ statement judged least important

Answer these questions with respect to your impressions of B.

1. How similar do you think B's ideas are to your own?

|            |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |         |  |      |
|------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------|--|------|
| not at all |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |         |  | very |
| similar    | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | similar |  |      |

2. How much do you like B?

|         |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |      |
|---------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|------|
| dislike | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | like |
|---------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|------|

3. How intelligent is B?

|             |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |             |  |      |
|-------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------|--|------|
| not very    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |             |  | very |
| intelligent | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | intelligent |  |      |



4. How much do you agree with B?

not at all    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    very much

5. How mature is B?

immature    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    mature

6. How warm is B?

cold    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    warm

7. How sincere is B?

insincere    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    sincere

8. In your estimation, how sensitive is B to your ideas and feelings?

not very  
sensitive    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    very  
sensitive

9. How interesting is B as a person?

uninteresting 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    interesting

10. How kind do you think B is?

unkind    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    kind

11. How friendly is B?

unfriendly    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    friendly

12. How creative is B?

uncreative    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    creative

13. How competent is B?

incompetent    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    competent

14. How much do you think B likes you?

dislike    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    like





PART II:

Answer the following questions with regard to your impressions of B's arguments.

1. How logical was B's position?

illogical      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      logical

2. How fair were B's arguments?

unfair          1      2      3      4      5      6      7      fair

3. How interesting were B's arguments?

uninteresting 1      2      3      4      5      6      7      interesting

4. How informed do you think B's arguments were?

uninformed    1      2      3      4      5      6      7      informed

PART III:

Since your impressions of others are affected by your ideas, we would like to know more about yourself. We would like to know how you would rate yourself in relation to B on these traits. (Circle your choice).

1. How intelligent are you?

unintelligent 1      2      3      4      5      6      7      intelligent

2. How mature are you?

immature      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      mature

3. How warm are you?

cold            1      2      3      4      5      6      7      warm

4. How sincere are you?

insincere      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      sincere



5. How sensitive are you to other's ideas and feelings?

|                       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |                   |
|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------|
| not very<br>sensitive | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | very<br>sensitive |
|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------|

6. How kind are you?

|        |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |      |
|--------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|------|
| unkind | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | kind |
|--------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|------|

7. How friendly are you?

|            |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| unfriendly | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | friendly |
|------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----------|

8. How creative are you?

|            |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| uncreative | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | creative |
|------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----------|

9. How competent are you?

|             |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |           |
|-------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| incompetent | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | competent |
|-------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------|

#### PART IV:

Your task is to determine how much you agree with the statement discussed at today's session. (Circle your choice).

|       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|-------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| agree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | disagree |
|-------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----------|



## APPENDIX F

## DEBRIEFING

1. How did you feel about this experiment generally?
2. Could you think of any improvements to the design?
3. Were you sincere in all your responses?
4. Did you understand your task in this experiment? Could you in your own words describe what you think this experiment is all about?



## APPENDIX G

High Expertise

I was born in Amsterdam, Holland and emigrated to the United States in 1956. During my school years, I excelled as a student and got along well with my classmates.

In the eleventh grade, something very important happened to me. I had been working on a science fair project for two years and won first prize for my extensive study of mollusks. When I was young, I never really had time to lead an active sporting life, for I seemed to spend most of my time reading books.

I regard myself as quiet and I like to work alone. My parents are professional people; my father a chemist and my mother a school teacher. I feel I have a close relationship to my parents.

I am now 32 years old, and in my later student years at the University of Wisconsin I took a B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees, the latter in personality theory in 1967. I am the co-author of a book on interpersonal attraction and have written a number of articles for professional journals. I have had extensive training in groups, and I have been recently involved in building a theory of values on the basis of my personal experiences.





Low Expertise

I am 32, and was born in Amsterdam, Holland. I emigrated to the United States in 1956. During my school years, I was an average student but got along well with my classmates. In the eleventh grade, I left school to help my father with the work on the farm.

I have never really been interested in school work. When I was young, I never liked to play in sporting events, because I spent most of my time working on the farm. Anyway, my parents have been farmers for several generations. I think I have a close relationship to my parents.

In 1965, I left home, and moved into Canada. I ended up in coming to Edmonton where I found work as an apprentice to a welder.

I am a good worker and have built much of my present home. I hope to save enough money to eventually buy my own farm in the Peace River country in Alberta.



## APPENDIX H

Table 1

Pre-test data of the number of Ss who rated the corresponding statement as being most important to them.

|                        | NUMBER OF <u>Ss</u> |
|------------------------|---------------------|
| A (approval)           | 9                   |
| S (status)             | 14                  |
| I (integrity)          | 51                  |
| F (authoritarianism)   | 8                   |
| O (other-directedness) | 118                 |
| H (hedonism)           | 58                  |
| Total                  | <u>255</u>          |

Table 2

Pre-test data of the number of Ss who rated the three most important issues. The distribution is divided into male and female Ss who met the criteria of selection and those who did not.<sup>5</sup>

| Issue | Criteria |         |       | No Criteria |         |       |
|-------|----------|---------|-------|-------------|---------|-------|
|       | Males    | Females | Total | Males       | Females | Total |
| O     | 56       | 51      | 107   | 6           | 2       | 8     |
| I     | 23       | 19      | 42    | 5           | 4       | 9     |
| H     | 31       | 20      | 51    | 3           | 4       | 7     |
| TOTAL | 110      | 90      | 200   | 14          | 10      | 24    |

<sup>5</sup> The selection criteria required Ss to agree with the value statement, and to regard it as important.



Table 3

The distribution of dogmatic and nondogmatic persons in the pre-test data.

| Issue | Nondogmatic |         |       | Dogmatic |         |       |
|-------|-------------|---------|-------|----------|---------|-------|
|       | Males       | Females | Total | Males    | Females | Total |
| O     | 14          | 11      | 25    | 12       | 11      | 23    |
| I     | 6           | 6       | 12    | 8        | 5       | 13    |
| H     | 6           | 7       | 13    | 9        | 5       | 14    |
| TOTAL | 26          | 24      | 50    | 29       | 21      | 50    |

Table 4

Means, standard deviations and test of significance for males and females on the assumed similarity (AS) score.

| Total sample | Males                         | Females      | t    | p    |
|--------------|-------------------------------|--------------|------|------|
| N = 64       | N = 32                        | N = 32       |      |      |
| AS score     | $\bar{X}$ = 4.22<br>SD = 1.99 | 4.06<br>1.66 | 0.36 | n.s. |

Table 5

Analysis of the Differences in the Effectiveness of the Communications

| Source                | SS     | df | MS   | F    |
|-----------------------|--------|----|------|------|
| Communications        | 2.99   | 2  | 1.50 | 0.38 |
| Within Communications | 238.01 | 61 | 3.90 |      |
| TOTAL                 | 241.00 |    |      |      |





Table 6

Analysis of the Favorablness of the Communications

| Source                | SS      | df | MS    | F    |
|-----------------------|---------|----|-------|------|
| Communications        | 85.96   | 2  | 42.98 | 2.06 |
| Within Communications | 1271.02 | 61 | 20.84 |      |
| TOTAL                 | 1356.98 | 63 |       |      |

Table 7

Means, standard deviations and test of significance for dogmatic and nondogmatic S's differences in self-description and the description of the stimulus person (B).

| Total sample<br>N = 64                   | Nondogmatic<br>Individuals      | Dogmatic<br>Individuals |
|--|---------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Favorableness of<br>Self-Description     | $\bar{X} = 40.53$<br>SD = 11.89 | 42.03<br>4.82           |
|  |                                 | t = 0.66                |
| Favorableness of<br>the Description of B | $\bar{X} = 39.19$<br>SD = 11.15 | 38.50<br>8.86           |
|  |                                 | t = 0.27                |



Table 8

Summary of the Analysis of Variance for the Personality Similarity (PS) Score.

| Source of Variation |                      | SS      | df | MS     | F       |
|---------------------|----------------------|---------|----|--------|---------|
| A:                  | Dogmatism            | 33.06   | 1  | 33.06  | 1.87    |
| B:                  | Agreement            | 351.56  | 1  | 351.56 | 19.93** |
| C:                  | Status               | 9.00    | 1  | 9.00   | -       |
| A x B:              | Dog x Agree          | 6.25    | 1  | 6.25   | -       |
| A x C:              | Dog x Status         | 175.56  | 1  | 175.56 | 9.95**  |
| B x C:              | Agree x Status       | 1.56    | 1  | 1.56   | -       |
| A x B x C:          | Dog x Agree x Status | 6.29    | 1  | 6.29   | -       |
| Error:              | Within Treatments    | 987.72  | 56 | 17.64  |         |
| TOTAL               |                      | 1571.00 | 63 |        |         |

\*\*  $p < .01$

Table 9

Summary of the Analysis of Variance for the Value Similarity (VS) Score

| Source of Variation |                      | SS     | df | MS    | F       |
|---------------------|----------------------|--------|----|-------|---------|
| A:                  | Dogmatism            | 5.07   | 1  | 5.07  | 2.40    |
| B:                  | Agreement            | 25.00  | 1  | 25.00 | 11.85** |
| C:                  | Status               | 3.07   | 1  | 3.07  | -       |
| A x B:              | Dog x Agree          | 2.25   | 1  | 2.25  | -       |
| A x C:              | Dog x Status         | 7.56   | 1  | 7.56  | 3.58    |
| B x C:              | Agree x Status       | 0.25   | 1  | 0.25  | -       |
| A x B x C:          | Dog x Agree x Status | 0.00   | 1  | 0.00  | -       |
| Error               | Within Treatments    | 118.24 | 56 | 2.11  |         |
| TOTAL               |                      | 161.44 | 63 |       |         |

\*\*  $p < .01$



Table 10

Summary of the Analysis of Variance for the Assumed Similarity (AS) Score.

| Source of Variation |                      | SS     | df | MS     | F        |
|---------------------|----------------------|--------|----|--------|----------|
| A:                  | Dogmatism            | 0.25   | 1  | 0.25   | -        |
| B:                  | Agreement            | 138.07 | 1  | 138.07 | 132.73** |
| C:                  | Status               | 1.00   | 1  | 1.00   | -        |
| A x B:              | Dog x Agree          | 3.06   | 1  | 3.06   | 2.94     |
| A x C:              | Dog x Status         | 4.00   | 1  | 4.00   | 3.85     |
| B x C:              | Agree x Status       | 1.00   | 1  | 1.00   | -        |
| A x B x C:          | Dog x Agree x Status | .08    | 1  | .08    | -        |
| Error:              | Within Treatments    | 57.98  | 56 | 1.04   |          |
| TOTAL               |                      | 215.44 | 63 |        |          |

\*\*  $p < .01$

Table 11

Summary of the Analysis of Variance for the Favorability of the Description of the Stimulus Person

| Source of Variation |                      | SS     | df | MS     | F      |
|---------------------|----------------------|--------|----|--------|--------|
| A:                  | Dogmatism            | 1.5    | 1  | 1.5    | -      |
| B:                  | Agreement            | 2232.5 | 1  | 2232.5 | 53.9** |
| C:                  | Status               | 650.2  | 1  | 650.2  | 15.7** |
| A x B:              | Dog x Agree          | 12.3   | 1  | 12.3   | -      |
| A x C:              | Dog x Status         | 855.6  | 1  | 855.6  | 20.7** |
| B x C:              | Agree x Status       | 203.1  | 1  | 203.1  | 4.9*   |
| A x B x C:          | Dog x Agree x Status | 0.2    | 1  | 0.2    | -      |
| Error:              | Within Treatments    | 2318.5 | 56 | 41.4   |        |
| TOTAL               |                      | 6273.7 | 63 |        |        |

\*\*  $p < .01$

\*  $p < .05$



Table 12

Summary of the Analysis of Variance for the Difference in Favorability of the Self-description and Description of the Stimulus Person.

|            | Source of Variation  | SS      | df | MS     | F       |
|------------|----------------------|---------|----|--------|---------|
| A:         | Dogmatism            | 27.56   | 1  | 27.56  | -       |
| B:         | Agreement            | 870.56  | 1  | 870.56 | 24.45** |
| C:         | Status               | 484.00  | 1  | 484.00 | 13.60** |
| A x B:     | Dog x Agree          | 1.56    | 1  | 1.56   | -       |
| A x C:     | Dog x Status         | 280.56  | 1  | 280.56 | 7.88**  |
| B x C:     | Agree x Status       | 64.00   | 1  | 64.00  | 1.80    |
| A x B x C: | Dog x Agree x Status | 248.08  | 1  | 248.08 | 6.97*   |
| Error:     | Within Treatments    | 1993.00 | 56 | 35.59  |         |
| TOTAL      |                      | 3969.32 | 63 |        |         |

\*\*  $p < .01$

\*  $p < .05$

Table 13

Summary of the Analysis of Variance of the Favorability of the Arguments

|            | Source of Variation  | SS      | df | MS     | F       |
|------------|----------------------|---------|----|--------|---------|
| A:         | Dogmatism            | 31.64   | 1  | 31.64  | 2.98    |
| B:         | Agreement            | 365.76  | 1  | 365.76 | 47.98** |
| C:         | Status               | 92.64   | 1  | 92.64  | 8.74**  |
| A x B:     | Dog x Agree          | 0.77    | 1  | 0.77   | -       |
| A x C:     | Dog x Status         | 0.14    | 1  | 0.14   | -       |
| B x C:     | Agree x Status       | 4.52    | 1  | 4.52   | -       |
| A x B x C: | Dog x Agree x Status | 13.16   | 1  | 13.16  | 1.24    |
| Error:     | Within Treatments    | 593.35  | 56 | 10.6   | -       |
| TOTAL      |                      | 1101.98 | 63 |        |         |

\*\*  $p < .01$





Table 14

## Summary of the Analysis of Variance of Value Change

| Summary of Variation |                      | SS    | df | MS   | F |
|----------------------|----------------------|-------|----|------|---|
| A:                   | Dogmatism            | 0.56  | 1  | 0.56 | - |
| B:                   | Agreement            | 0.06  | 1  | 0.06 | - |
| C:                   | Status               | 0.00  | 1  | 0.00 | - |
| A x B:               | Dog x Agree          | 0.25  | 1  | 0.25 | - |
| A x C:               | Dog x Status         | 0.56  | 1  | 0.56 | - |
| B x C:               | Agree x Status       | 0.56  | 1  | 0.56 | - |
| A x B x C:           | Dog x Agree x Status | 0.00  | 1  | 0.00 | - |
| Error:               | Within Treatments    | 39.78 | 56 | 0.71 |   |
| TOTAL                |                      | 41.75 | 63 |      |   |

Table 15

## Pearson Product Moment Correlation Values for Value Change and the Dependent Measures

|                           | Dogmatic<br>Persons | Nondogmatic<br>Persons |      |
|---------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|------|
| Value similarity          | -.06                | .16                    | n.s. |
| Assumed similarity        | .06                 | -.11                   | n.s. |
| Personality similarity    | .20                 | .05                    | n.s. |
| Favorability of B         | -.16                | -.07                   | n.s. |
| Favorability of Arguments | -.06                | -.28                   | n.s. |











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